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y proposal put forward by the General Staff. The people would have followed the King as one man. And the enemy were not ready. All that was necessary was to study with attention and sympathy the advice of the experts: to call the soldiers of the countries concerned to council, and to inaugurate a joint campaign. It was not done--and it is difficult to say now to whom the failure proved most disastrous--to Servia, to Greece, or to the Entente Powers. But for this failure a proportionate share of blame must be laid upon those who, instead of striving to heal divisions in Greece, did everything they could to foment them. [1] _White Book_, No. 34. [2] "Conversation with M. Demidoff," Politis, 25 Feb./10 March, 1915. [3] _White Book_, No. 35. [4] The best proof is to be found in the Venizelist _White Book_, No. 36,--an exhaustive memorandum by M. Streit on the probabilities of the War, dated 13/26 March, 1915. It is both striking and illuminating that, while in dealing with the attitude of Bulgaria, the author considers three alternatives: (1) Bulgaria in alliance with the Entente. (2) Bulgaria as neutral. (3) Bulgaria as an enemy of the Entente. In dealing with the attitude of Greece he does not for a single moment contemplate more than two alternatives: (1) Greece as an ally of the Entente. (2) Greece as neutral. Further, in the course of the argument which follows, M. Streit discusses a possible understanding between Greece on the one part and Rumania and Bulgaria on the other, with the object either of a common neutrality or, failing that, of a simultaneous entry into war in favour of the Entente, "on whose side alone we can range ourselves." [5] See the _Nea Hellas_, 22 March (O.S.), 1915. [6] _Conversation entre le President du Conseil et les Ministres des Puissances de la Triple Entente, 30 mars/12 avril, 1915_. [7] Zographos to Greek Minister, Paris, 1/14 April, with the Proposal of same date; _Orations_, pp. 67-9. [8] Romanos, Paris, 17/30 April, 1915. [9] Zographos to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petrograd, 18 April/1 May, 1915. [10] Romanos, Paris, 4 May (N.S.), 1915. [11] Zographos to Greek Legation, Paris, 22 April/5 May, 1915. [12] Prince George to Zographos, Paris, 24 April/7 May, 1915. [13] King Constantine to Prince George, 27 April/10 May, 1915. From this document we also learn that on 7/20 April, M. Poincare had assured the Prince that such a guarantee would c
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