anelles had been
subjected to a brief bombardment with the object of testing the range of
their guns; and by 25 November the idea of a serious attack on the
Straits had engaged the attention of the British War Council. But no
decision was arrived at until January, when Russia, hard pressed by the
Turks on the Caucasus, begged for a demonstration against them in some
other quarter. In compliance with this appeal, the British War Council
then decided to attempt to force the Dardanelles by means of the Navy
alone. After the failure of the naval attack of 19 February, however, it
was realized that the operations would have to be supplemented by
military action;[10] and as the magnitude of the enterprise became
clearer and the troops at the disposal of England and France were very
limited, the need of securing Balkan allies became more obvious.

From the first greater importance was attached to Bulgarian co-operation
than to Greek. Even the grant of {28} a loan to Sofia by the Central
Powers appears to have produced little or no impression upon those
concerned. Long afterwards it was admitted as a self-evident proposition
that belligerents do not lend to neutrals without being satisfied that
their money will not be used against themselves. But at the time, after
a momentary shock, the Entente Governments were deluded, either by
Bulgarian diplomacy or by their own wishes, into the belief that
"Bulgaria would not commit the stupidity to refuse the advantages
offered." [11] Nor, in thus reckoning on enlightened bad faith, were
they alone. M. Venizelos, who a moment before had declared that the loan
had opened his eyes to the fact "that Bulgaria was definitely committed
to the Central Powers," now felt quite sure that, "notwithstanding the
loan, Bulgaria was capable of betraying her then friends and turning
towards those who promised her greater profits." [12] Anxious,
therefore, to forestall the Bulgars, and concerned by the thought that he
had been obliged on three occasions to decline requests from the Entente,
he spontaneously proposed, on 1 March, to offer three Greek divisions for
the Dardanelles expedition, stating that this proposal was made with King
Constantine's assent.[13]

As a matter of fact, neither the King nor his General Staff approved of
M. Venizelos's strategy. Having made a systematic study of the
Dardanelles problem, they judged that the Allies' enterprise, even under
the most skilful handling, p