one division of its army." All this, "though the King {31} has not
yet given his adhesion." [18] His hurry arose from the belief that the
Allies would reach Constantinople in a few days.

But the General Staff still remained unconvinced. Yes, they said, one
division to begin with; but what if the Allies get stuck in the Straits,
as we believe they will be, and call upon us for more? And, once we join
them, how can we refuse to supply their needs? We shall be incurring
unlimited liabilities. So the King, who had full confidence in his
military advisers, and who could not bring himself to look upon the
Gallipoli adventure as a "serious enterprise," [19] declined his adhesion
to M. Venizelos's plan; and M. Venizelos resigned in wrath (6 March).

Then came the Entente replies to his communication; from which it
appeared that, as in August, 1914, so now the impetuous Cretan ran ahead
of the Powers: that, whilst he was inveighing against everyone who would
not let Greece co-operate with them, they had not yet even agreed as to
whether they desired her co-operation.

England regarded the communication as a merely preliminary and
preparatory step, and waited for a definite proposal after the King's
decision, when she would consult with her allies. France and Russia
insisted on the impossibility of Greece limiting her participation to a
war against Turkey alone: to be an effective partner of the Entente,
Greece must be prepared to fight Austria and Germany also. France added
that the question of the participation of Greece in the Dardanelles
enterprise could not be a useful subject of discussion between the Allies
until a definite decision by the Greek Government was taken. Russia did
not even envisage the usefulness of such a discussion. M. Sazonow
pointedly declared that he did not consider Greek co-operation in the
Dardanelles at all necessary, that the question of the Straits and of
Constantinople ought to be settled by the Entente Powers alone without
the intervention of third parties, and that Russia did not desire the
entry of a Greek army into Constantinople, though she had no objection to
its operating against Smyrna or elsewhere.[20]

{32}

Some days later, it is true, M. Delcasse affirmed that he had overcome
Russia's repugnance;[21] but, though it is probable that Russia, yielding
to pressure, would have accepted the participation of Greek troops, she
made no secret of her satisfaction at not having ha