f this territory exceeds
125,000 (the figure was soon raised to 140,000) square kilometres, while
the area to be ceded in Macedonia did not exceed 2,000 square kilometres,
and that loss would be further halved by the acquisition from Servia of
the Doiran-Ghevgheli district, which covered some 1,000 square
kilometres. Thus, in point of territory, Greece would be giving up a
hundred and fortieth part of what she would be getting. In point of
population also Greece would be receiving twenty-five times as much as
she would be sacrificing--an accretion of 800,000 as against a loss of
30,000 souls; and that loss could be obviated by obliging Bulgaria to buy
up the property of the Cavalla Greeks, who, he had no doubt, would gladly
emigrate _en masse_ to Asia Minor, to reinforce the Greek element there.
How was it possible to hesitate about seizing such an opportunity--an
opportunity for the creation of a Greece powerful on land and supreme in
the Aegean Sea--"an opportunity verily presented to us by Divine
Providence for the realization of our most audacious national
ideals"--presented to-day and never likely to occur again?

M. Venizelos did not doubt but that a transaction which appeared so
desirable and feasible to him must appear equally desirable and feasible
to others: and great was his surprise to find that such was by no means
the case. The General Staff, he complained, "seem, strangely, not
attracted strongly by these views." And the same might be said of
everyone who judged, not by the glow of prophetic insight, but by a cold
examination of facts. When Asia Minor was first mentioned to the Greek
Minister in London, that shrewd diplomat answered: "Greece would not
commit such a folly, for the day she set foot in {26} Asia Minor she
would find herself up against Great Powers as well as against Turkey."
[5] At Athens to this objection were added others not less weighty. The
General Staff pointed out that Greece had neither the men nor the money
required for the permanent occupation and efficient administration of
that distant region. They feared both the difficulties of defending
those Turkish territories in Asia and the danger of future attack from
Bulgaria in Europe. In short, they held that Greece by embarking on what
they aptly termed a Colonial policy would be undertaking responsibilities
wholly incommensurate with her resources.[6]

Dangers and difficulties! cried M. Venizelos: can you allow such things