resented but few chances, and those chances
had been discounted in advance by utter want of skilful handling: the
bombardment of the Straits in the previous November had given the Turks
warning of the blow and ample time to prepare against it--and the Turks
were no longer the happy-go-lucky fellows upon whose inefficiency one
might formerly have counted; they now mounted guard over the gates of
their capital equipped with German guns and commanded by German officers.
The enterprise was likely to become more hazardous still by arousing the
jealousy of the Bulgars. If, therefore, Greece did join in, besides all
the other risks, she would expose herself to a {29} Bulgarian assault;
and with a considerable portion of her forces engaged in Gallipoli, and
no prospect either of Servian or of Rumanian assistance, how was she to
face that assault?
The King's disapproval was known to no one better than to M. Venizelos
himself. But, for all that, he felt entitled to tell the British
Minister at Athens that he had the King's assent. Here is his own
explanation: "The King was opposed to the enterprise. I sought another
interview in order to speak to him again on the subject, and took with me
a third memorandum"--which has never been published, and cannot yet be
published. "I asked him to let me read it to him, for in it were set
forth fully all the arguments which, in my opinion, imposed co-operation.
I read it. I saw that the King became agitated. For--I must do him that
justice--he rarely remained unconvinced when face to face with me. So
profound was the emotion with which I spoke, so powerful were the
arguments which I used that the King, greatly moved, said to me: 'Well,
then, in the name of God.' That is, he assented." [14]
However, the General Staff remained unconvinced; and Colonel Metaxas, a
brilliant soldier, then Acting-Chief of the Staff, resigned as a protest
against military proposals being made by a Greek minister to other
countries without previous consultation with the military experts of his
own. M. Venizelos, on his part, was indignant that mere soldiers should
presume to meddle with the plans of statesmen; his view being that the
Staff's business was simply to carry out the policy of the Government.
Nevertheless, impressed by this resignation, he suggested the meeting of
a Crown Council composed of all the ex-Premiers, that their opinions
might be heard. The Council met on 3 March and again on 5 Marc
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