uld not give up the hope of
seeing her on their side. Indeed, they were more hopeful than ever; M.
Poincare told Prince George he would not be surprised to see that
happen "in two or three days," [17] and the British Minister at Sofia,
being less hopeful and giving proofs of perspicacity, was replaced.

About the same time it came to the knowledge of the Entente Governments
that the Greek General Staff had resumed its efforts to induce the
Servian military authorities to concert measures for their mutual
safety, pointing out that, the moment Bulgarian troops crossed the
Servian frontier, it would be too late. Whereupon both Servia and
Greece were sternly warned against wounding Bulgarian
susceptibilities--and threatened with the displeasure of the Powers,
who wanted to maintain between the Balkan States good fellowship--by
the unhappy project which was once more to the fore. And ere the end
of May both States learnt that their territories were actually on offer
to Bulgaria.

They received the intelligence as might have been expected. The
Servian Premier, after consulting with the King, the Crown Prince, the
Cabinet, and all prominent statesmen, informed the representatives of
the Entente that Servia, in spite of her desire to meet the wishes of
her friends and allies, could not agree to put herself in their hands:
the Constitution forbade the cession of territory without the sanction
of the National Assembly. He asked them to understand that this
decision was final, and that no future Servian Government could be
counted upon to {41} give a different answer, seeing that the present
Government embraced every political party.[18]

Not less uncompromising was the attitude of Greece. When the news
reached Athens from Paris, the Hellenic Government could hardly believe
it: "It is so contrary to the principles of justice and liberty
proclaimed by the Entente Powers--it seems to us absolutely impossible
to despoil a neutral State, and one, too, whose friendly neutrality has
been so consistently useful to the Allies, in order to buy with its
territories the help of a people which has hitherto done all it could
to help the enemies of the Entente. By what right, and on what ground
could they mutilate our country? The opinions once expressed by M.
Venizelos, and since abandoned even by their author, do not constitute
a sufficient ground for spoliation. The whole thing is an unthinkable
outrage: it shows that our fears w