reece, who had thus the right to count on her independence
being respected. The Entente Powers, he went on, thought they could
promise Bulgaria an agreement in which their own will took the place of
Greece's consent, with the idea of exacting her acceptance afterwards.
But they were greatly mistaken. The Hellenic Government, voicing the
unanimous sentiments of the people as well as its own judgment,
repelled with indignation the idea of making the national heritage an
object of a bargain; and while thanking the Entente Powers for the
courtesy which inspired their notification, it protested in the most
energetic and solemn manner against the injury which they proposed to
inflict upon the independence and integrity of Greece in defiance of
international law.

In reply, the British Government quietly informed the Hellenic
Government that the Entente Powers still hoped that Greece would come
into line with their policy, and that, as soon as Bulgaria had accepted
their offer, they would submit a concrete proposal dealing in detail
with {43} the surrender of Cavalla and defining precisely the Asiatic
concessions which Greece would receive in exchange.[20]

This brings the relations of the Entente Powers with M. Gounaris's
Government to an end. It is a strange record. We have, to begin with,
the curious reception of his first offer--the whole Greek Army, the
intervention of which might have turned the Gallipoli tragedy into a
victory. Doubtless, there were reasons for declining so considerable a
reinforcement. We know that, although Russia had modified her
objection to Greek participation, she still regarded the presence of a
large Greek force in European Turkey with disfavour; that the
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was not agreeable to France; that
the Allies could not at that time afford the military contingents
stipulated by the Greek General Staff. There will be no disposition to
underrate the complexities of the situation, or want of sympathy for
those upon whom fell the task of finding a solution satisfactory to all
the Powers concerned. But, though these complexities might be good
reasons for not accepting the Gounaris offer, they were hardly reasons
for not acknowledging it, even in the interest of ordinary courtesy.

Then came the sterile pourparlers through Paris. Here, again,
political difficulties explain without justifying the attitude of the
Entente Powers. Their refusal of the guarantee demande