ek policy.[3]

That, by all the evidence available, was the truth. M. Gounaris
thought as M. Venizelos thought, as King Constantine thought, as,
indeed, every Greek capable of forming an opinion on international
affairs thought--namely that, if Greece were to fight at all, interest
and sentiment alike impelled her to fight on the side of the
Entente.[4] The only question was whether she should enter the field
then, and if so, on what conditions.

M. Venizelos persisted in declaring that the Dardanelles expedition
presented "a great, a unique opportunity," which he prayed, "God grant
that Greece may not miss." [5] His successors had no wish to miss the
opportunity--if such it was. But neither had they any wish to leap in
the dark. M. Gounaris and his colleagues lacked the Cretan's infinite
capacity for taking chances. Even in war, where chance plays so great
a part, little is gained except by calculation: the enterprise which is
not carefully meditated upon in all its details is rarely crowned with
success.

And so when, on 12 April, the representatives of the Entente signified
to M. Gounaris their readiness to give Greece, in return for her
co-operation against Turkey, the "territorial acquisitions in the
vilayet of Aidin," suggested {35} to his predecessor, M. Gounaris tried
to ascertain exactly the form of the co-operation demanded and the
extent of the "territorial acquisitions in the vilayet of Aidin"
offered. The British Minister replied as to the first point that,
having no instructions, he was unable to give any details; and as for
the second, that it referred to the "very important concessions on the
Asia Minor coast" mentioned in Sir Edward Grey's communication of
January. On being further pressed, he said it meant "Smyrna and a
substantial portion of the hinterland"--a definition with which his
Russian and French colleagues were inclined to concur, though both said
that they had no instructions on the subject. Then M. Gounaris asked
whether their Excellencies had transmitted to their respective
Governments M. Venizelos's interpretation of Sir Edward Grey's offer
regarding its geographical limits. The British Minister replied that
he had no official knowledge of that interpretation; he had only heard
of it semi-officially and had transmitted it to his Government, but had
received no answer. The Russian Minister replied that he had
transmitted nothing on the subject to his Government, as he had be