dvantage in number and size of ships is slightly with the
Russians. As a consequence of that battle, the war between Russia
and Japan was decided in favor of Japan, and terms of peace were
soon agreed upon. Russia lost practically all the ships that took
part in the battle, and several thousand of her officers and
sailors--and _she lost the whole object for which she went to war_.

The difference between the Russian and Japanese fleets that gave
the victory to the Japanese was a difference in trained intelligence
and in the relative degrees of preparedness which that difference
caused.

During the actual battle, the intelligence was that of the officers
and men in the respective fleets, in managing the two fleets, the
ships themselves, and the guns, engines, and machines of all kinds that
those ships contained. It is this factor--trained intelligence--that
has decided most of the battles of history, and the course that
nations thereafter followed. Battles have usually been fought between
forces not very different in point of numbers and material, for the
reason that a force which knew itself to be weaker than another
would not fight unless compelled to fight; and in cases where two
forces of widely differing strength have fought, the situation has
usually been brought about directly by a superior intelligence. In
fact, one of the most frequent and important endeavors of strategy
and tactics--used triumphantly by Napoleon--has always been such
a handling of one's forces as to be superior to the enemy at the
point of contact--to "get the mostest men there the firstest," as
General Forrest is said to have expressed it.

The effect of superior-trained intelligence is greatest "at the top,"
but it can accomplish little unless a fine intelligence permeates the
whole. A fine intelligence at the top will so direct the men below,
will so select men for the various posts, and will so co-ordinate
their efforts, that the organization will resemble a veritable
organism: all the various organs fulfilling separately yet accurately
their allotted functions; all the fire-control parties, all the
gun crews, all the torpedo crews, all the engineer forces properly
organized and drilled; all the hulls of the vessels, all the guns,
all the torpedoes, all the multifarious engines, machines, and
instruments in good material condition and correctly adjusted for
use.

But it is not only in the actual battle that fine intelligence is
requir