positive, initiative
prescribed for a portion of the fleet, with a view to divide the enemy,
and then concentrate the whole fleet upon the fraction thus isolated.
The British van takes a particular, but not an independent, action; for
the other divisions contribute their part to the common purpose. "The
middle squadron is to keep her wind, and to observe the motion of the
enemy's van, which" [that is, "which" action of the middle squadron]
"the last squadron--the rear--is to second; and both of these squadrons
are to do their utmost to assist or relieve the first squadron, that
divided the enemy's fleet." Evidently here we have tactical combination
in order to decisive action; clearly contemplated also beforehand, not
merely by a capable individual general, but by the consensus of
professional opinion which such a paper as the Fighting Instructions
necessarily reflects. The stamp of the galley period is upon this:
strenuous and close battle, the piercing of the enemy's order, the
movement of the squadrons differentiated, in order that they may in a
real and effective sense _combine_, instead of being merely
_distributed_, as they afterwards were by both the letter of the later
Instructions and the tradition by which these became encrusted. Nor
should there be overlooked, in this connection, the discretion allowed
the centre and rear. They are to "keep their wind;" an expression which
leaves optional whether to tack, or stand as they are, whether to engage
the separated enemies to windward or to leeward, as occasion may offer,
in support of the van. The provisions of 1665 afterwards disappear. In
1740, and even as late as 1781, they are traceable only in certain
colorless articles, suggestive of the atrophied organs of a body
concerning whose past use physiologists may speculate.

As in the restoration of sounder methods, with which we shall be
concerned, this degeneration of ideals was a work of time. In June,
1666, the British met with a severe check in the Four Days Battle, in
which Monk, a soldier, commanded in chief. This reverse is chiefly to
be attributed to antecedent strategic errors, which made a portion only
of the available British force bear the brunt of the first three days;
but, among the inevitable criticisms, we find stress laid upon fighting
in line as essential to success. This insistence upon the line as an
effective instrument proceeded, among others, from Sir William Penn, a
seaman, and was at that