manoeuvre favored by the Court for the
fleet as a whole was in fact just that which Byng attempted for his own
division, with the results that have been narrated. These were
aggravated by his mismanagement, but did not originate from it.

The invariable result of an attack thus attempted, however vigorously
made, was that the van of the assailant got into action first, receiving
the brunt of the enemy's fire without proper support. Not infrequently,
it also underwent a second hammering from the enemy's rear, precisely in
the same way as occurred in Byng's action; and whether this happened or
not depended more upon the enemy than upon the British rear. In
ignoring, therefore, the idea of combining an attack in superior
numbers upon a part of the enemy, and adopting instead that of an
onslaught upon his whole, all along the line, the British practice of
the eighteenth century not only surrendered the advantage which the
initiative has, of effecting a concentration, but subjected their own
fleets to being beaten in detail, subject only to the skill of the
opponent in using the opportunity extended to him. The results, at best,
were indecisive, tactically considered. The one apparent exception was
in June, 1794, when Lord Howe, after long vainly endeavoring a better
combination with a yet raw fleet, found himself forced to the old
method; but although then several ships were captured, this issue seems
attributable chiefly to the condition of the French Navy, greatly fallen
through circumstances foreign to the present subject. It was with this
system that Rodney was about to break, the first of his century formally
to do so. A false tactical standard, however, was not the only drawback
under which the British Navy labored in 1739. The prolonged series of
wars, which began when the establishment of civil order under Cromwell
permitted the nation to turn from internal strife to external interests,
had been for England chiefly maritime. They had recurred at brief
intervals, and had been of such duration as to insure a continuity of
experience and development. Usage received modification under the
influence of constant warlike practice, and the consequent changes in
methods, if not always thoroughly reasoned, at the least reflected a
similar process of professional advance in the officers of the service.
This was consecutively transmitted, and by the movement of actual war
was prevented from stagnating and hardening into an acce