uctions, it seems not to have occurred to him. His one idea was to
conform to them, and he apprehended that after tacking, as they
prescribed, the new van ship would bear down and engage without further
orders, keeping parallel to the French when within point-blank, the
others following her as they could; a process which, from the varying
distances, would expose each to a concentrated fire as they successively
approached. Byng's action is only explicable to the writer by supposing
that he thus by "steer with" understood "steer for;" for when, after the
fleet tacked together, the new van ship (formerly the rear) did not of
her own motion head for the leading enemy, he signalled her to steer one
point, and then two points, in that direction. This, he explained in his
defence, was "to put the leading captain in mind of his Instructions,
who I perceived did not steer away with the enemy's leading ship
agreeable to the 19th Article of the Fighting Instructions." The results
of these orders not answering his expectations, he then made the signal
to engage, as the only remaining way perceptible to him for carrying out
the Instructions.
To summarize the foregoing, up to the moment the signal for battle was
made: While the fleets were striving for the weather gage, the wind had
shifted to the southwest. The French, momentarily disordered by the
change, had formed in line ahead about noon, heading northwest,
westerly, so as just to keep their main topsails aback and the ships
with bare steerage way, but under command (F3). The British standing
south-southeast, by the wind, were passing (B2-B3) across the
head of the enemy's fleet at a distance of from three to two miles--the
latter being the estimate by their ships then in the rear. The French
having twelve vessels in line and the British thirteen, the gradual
progress of the latter should bring their then van "the length of the
enemy's rear," about the time the rear came abreast of his van. When
this happened, the Instructions required that the fleet tack together,
and then stand for the enemy, ship to ship, number one to number one,
and so along the line till the number twelves met[2].
This Byng purposed to do, but, unluckily for himself, ventured on a
refinement. Considering that, if his vessels bore down when abreast
their respective antagonists, they would go bows-on, perpendicularly,
subject to a raking--enfilading--fire, he deferred the signal to tack
till his van had p
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