n a single column,
awaited attack. Rooke, having the advantage of the wind, and therefore
the power of engaging at will, formed his command in a similar and
parallel line a few miles off, and thus all stood down together, the
ships maintaining their line parallel to that of the enemy, and coming
into action at practically the same moment, van to van, centre to
centre, rear to rear. This ignored wholly the essential maxim of all
intelligent warfare, which is so to engage as markedly to outnumber the
enemy at a point of main collision. If he be broken there, before the
remainder of his force come up, the chances all are that a decisive
superiority will be established by this alone, not to mention the moral
effect of partial defeat and disorder. Instead of this, the impact at
Malaga was so distributed as to produce a substantial equality from one
end to the other of the opposing fronts. The French, indeed, by
strengthening their centre relatively to the van and rear, to some
extent modified this condition in the particular instance; but the fact
does not seem to have induced any alteration in Rooke's dispositions.
Barring mere accident, nothing conclusive can issue from such
arrangements. The result accordingly was a drawn battle, although Rooke
says that the fight, which was maintained on both sides "with great fury
for three hours, ... was the sharpest day's service that I ever saw;" and
he had seen much,--Beachy Head, La Hougue, Vigo Bay, not to mention his
own great achievement in the capture of Gibraltar.

This method of attack remained the ideal--if such a word is not a
misnomer in such a case--of the British Navy, not merely as a matter of
irreflective professional acceptance, but laid down in the official
"Fighting Instructions." It cannot be said that these err on the side of
lucidity; but their meaning to contemporaries in this particular
respect is ascertained, not only by fair inference from their contents,
but by the practical commentary of numerous actions under commonplace
commanders-in-chief. It further received authoritative formulation in
the specific finding of the Court-Martial upon Admiral Byng, which was
signed by thirteen experienced officers. "Admiral Byng should have
caused his ships to tack together, and should immediately have borne
down upon the enemy; his van steering for the enemy's van, his rear for
its rear, each ship making for the one opposite to her in the enemy's
line, under such sail as