would have enabled the worst sailer to preserve
her station in the line of battle." Each phrase of this opinion is a
reflection of an article in the Instructions. The line of battle was the
naval fetich of the day; and, be it remarked, it was the more dangerous
because in itself an admirable and necessary instrument, constructed on
principles essentially accurate. A standard wholly false may have its
error demonstrated with comparative ease; but no servitude is more
hopeless than that of unintelligent submission to an idea formally
correct, yet incomplete. It has all the vicious misleading of a
half-truth unqualified by appreciation of modifying conditions; and so
seamen who disdained theories, and hugged the belief in themselves as
"practical," became _doctrinaires_ in the worst sense.

It would seem, however, that a necessary antecedent to deliverance from
a false conception,--as from any injurious condition,--is a practical
illustration of its fallacy. Working consequences must receive
demonstration, concrete in some striking disastrous event, before
improvement is undertaken. Such experience is painful to undergo; but
with most men, even in their private capacity, and in nearly all
governmental action where mere public interests are at stake, remedy is
rarely sought until suffering is not only felt, but signalized in a
conspicuous incident. It is needless to say that the military
professions in peace times are peculiarly liable to this apathy; like
some sleepers, they can be awakened only by shaking. For them, war alone
can subject accepted ideas to the extreme test of practice. It is
doubtless perfectly true that acquaintance with military and naval
history, mastery of their teachings, will go far to anticipate the
penalty attaching to truth's last argument--chastisement; but
imagination is fondly impatient of warning by the past, and easily
avails itself of fancied or superficial differences in contemporary
conditions, to justify measures which ignore, or even directly
contravene, ascertained and fundamental principles of universal
application.

Even immediate practical experience is misinterpreted when incidents are
thus viewed through the medium of a precedent bias. The Transvaal War,
for instance, has afforded some striking lessons of needed
modifications, consequent upon particular local factors, or upon
developments in the material of war; but does any thoughtful military
man doubt that imagination has bee