eks how to get it done. On 9
December Kenworthy telephoned Philleo Nash at the White House to
inform him of the considerable sentiment in the committee for
publicizing the whole affair and read to him the draft of a press
statement prepared by Fahy. As Fahy expected, the White House wanted
to avoid publicity; the President, through Nash, assured the committee
that the issues of assignment and quota were still under discussion.
Nash suggested that instead of a public statement the committee
prepare a document for the Army and the White House explaining what
principles and procedures were demanded by the presidential order. In
his opinion, Nash assured Kenworthy, the White House would order the
Army to meet the committee's recommendations.[14-112]

[Footnote 14-112: Memo for Rcd, Kenworthy, 9 Dec 49,
sub: Telephone Conversation With Nash, Fahy Papers,
Truman Library.]

White House pressure undoubtedly played a major role in the resolution
of the assignment issue. When on 14 December 1949 the committee
presented the Army and the President with its comments on the Army's
proposed revision of Circular 124, it took the first step toward what
was to be a rapid agreement on black assignments. At the same time it
would be a mistake to discount the effectiveness of reasonable men of
good will discussing their very real differences in an effort to reach
a consensus. There is considerable evidence that when Fahy met on 27
December with Secretary Gray and General J. Lawton Collins, the Chief
of Staff, he was able to convince them that the committee's position
on the assignment of black graduates of specialist schools was right
and inevitable.[14-113]

[Footnote 14-113: Interv, Nichols with Fahy. J. Lawton
Collins became Chief of Staff of the Army on 1
August 1949, succeeding Omar Bradley who stepped up
to the chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.]

While neither Gray nor Collins could even remotely be described as
social reformers, both were pragmatic leaders, prepared to accept
changes in Army tradition.[14-114] Collins, unlike his immediate
predecessors, was not so much concerned with finding the Army in the
vanguard of American social practices as he was in determining that
its racial practices guaranteed a more efficient organization. While
he wanted to retain the numerical quota, lest the