CMH files; see also Testimony of Royall at National
Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, 26 Apr 48,
copy in CMH.]

[Footnote 13-31: General Paul's Remarks at Army
Commanders Conference, 30 Mar-2 Apr 48, p. 30,
CSUSA 337.]

Secure in his belief that segregation was right and necessary, Royall
confidently awaited the judgment of the recently appointed President's
committee. He was convinced that any fair judge could draw but one
conclusion: under the provisions of Circular 124, Negroes had (p. 323)
already achieved equal treatment and opportunity in the Army. His job,
therefore, was relatively simple. He had to defend Army policy against
outside attack and make sure it was applied uniformly throughout the
service. His stand marked one of the last attempts by a major federal
official to support a racially separate but equal system before the
principle was finally struck down by the Supreme Court in _Brown_ v.
_Board of Education_.

[Illustration: SECRETARY ROYALL REVIEWS MILITARY POLICE, _Yokohama,
Japan, 1949_.]

Royall readily conceded that it was proper and necessary for Negroes
to insist on integration, but, echoing a long-cherished Army belief,
he adamantly opposed using the Army to support or oppose any social
cause. The Army, he contended, must follow the nation, not lead it, in
social matters. The Army must not experiment. When, "without prejudice
to the National Defense," the Army could reduce segregation to the
platoon level it would do so, but all such steps should be taken one
at a time. And 1948, he told the conference of black leaders in April
of that year, was not the time.[13-32]

[Footnote 13-32: See Testimony of Royall at National
Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, 26 Apr 48, pp.
24-26.]

Convinced of the rightness of the Army's policy, Secretary Royall was
understandably agitated by the unfavorable publicity directed at him
and his department. The publicity, he was convinced, resulted from
discrimination on the part of "the Negro and liberal press" (p. 324)
against the Army's policy in favor of the Navy and Air Force. He was
particularly incensed at the way the junior services had escaped the
"rap"--his word--on racial matters. He ascribed it in large part, he
told the Secretary of Defense in September 1948, to the "un