dards was justified. With a bow to Secretary Symington's new
and limited integration policy, the committee deferred further
recommendations.

It showed no such reluctance when it came to the Army. It wanted the
Army to abolish racial considerations in the designation of military
occupational specialties, attendance at its schools, and use of its
school graduates in their military specialties. In line with the
establishment of a parity of enlistment standards among the services,
the committee wanted the Army to abandon its racial quotas. The
committee did not insist on an immediate end to segregation in the
Army, believing that no matter how desirable, such a drastic change
could not be accomplished, as Davenport had warned, without very (p. 358)
serious administrative confusion. Besides, there were other pragmatic
reasons for adopting the gradualist approach. For the committee to
demand immediate and complete integration would risk an outcry from
Capitol Hill that might endanger the whole reform program. Gradual
change, on the other hand, would allow time for qualified Negroes to
attend school courses, and the concept that Negroes had a right to
equal educational opportunities was one that was very hard for the
segregationists to attack, given the American belief in education and
the right of every child to its benefits.[14-56] If the Army could be
persuaded to adopt these recommendations, the committee reasoned, the
Army itself would gradually abolish segregation. The committee's
formula for equality of treatment and opportunity in the Army,
therefore, was simple and straightforward, but each of its parts had
to be accepted to achieve the whole.

[Footnote 14-56: Memo, Kenworthy for Chief of Military
History, 13 Oct 76, CMH.]

As it was, the committee's program for gradual change proved to be a
rather large dose for senior service officials. An Army representative
on the Personnel Policy Board staff characterized the committee's work
as "presumptuous," "subjective," and "argumentative." He also charged
the committee with failing to interpret the executive order and thus
leaving unclear whether the President wanted across-the-board
integration, and if so how soon.[14-57] The Personnel Policy Board
ignored these larger questions when it considered the subject on 26
May, focusing its opposition instead on two of the committee's
recommendations. It wanted Secretary Johnson to make