, John Nicholas Brown, believed that the gradual
indoctrination of the naval establishment was producing the desired
nondiscriminatory practices "on a sound and permanent basis without
concomitant problems of morale and discipline." To adopt Royall's
proposal, on the other hand, would "unnecessarily risk losing all that
has been accomplished in the solution of the efficient utilization of
Negro personnel to the limit of their ability."[13-50] Brown did not
spell out the risk, but a Navy spokesman on Forrestal's staff was (p. 330)
not so reticent. "Mutiny cannot be dismissed from consideration,"
Capt. Herbert D. Riley warned, if the Navy were forced to integrate
its officers' wardrooms, staterooms, and clubs. Such integration ran
considerably in advance of the Navy's current and carefully controlled
integration of the enlisted general service and would, like the
proposal to place Negroes in command of white officers and men,
Captain Riley predicted, have such dire results as wholesale
resignations and retirements.[13-51]
[Footnote 13-50: Memo, Actg SecNav for SecDef, 28 Dec
48, CD 30-1-2, SecDef files.]
[Footnote 13-51: Memo, Capt H. D. Riley, USN, OSD, for
SecDef, 6 Dec 48, sub: Comment on the Secretary of
the Army's Proposal Concerning Experimental
Non-Segregated Units in the Armed Forces, CD
30-1-2, SecDef files.]
[Illustration: SECRETARY FORRESTAL, _accompanied by General Huebner,
inspects the 427th Army Band and the 7777th EUCOM Honor Guard,
Heidelberg, Germany, November 1948_.]
The decisive opposition of the Navy and Air Force convinced Forrestal
that interservice integration was unworkable. In short, the Navy and
Air Force had progressed in their own estimation to the point where,
despite shortcomings in their racial policies rivaling the Army's,
they had little to fear from the coming White House investigation. The
Army could show no similar forward motion. Despite Royall's claim that
he and the Army staff favored eventual integration of black soldiers
through progressive reduction in the size of the Army's segregated
black units, the facts indicated otherwise. For example, while
Secretary of Defense Forrestal was touring Germany in late 1948 he
noted in his diary of Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, now the commander
of Europe: "Huebner's experience with colored troops is exce
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