its offer to
experiment with integration and let the whole problem dissipate in a
lengthy interservice argument.[13-47]

[Footnote 13-47: Interv, author with James C. Evans, 1
Jul 70; Ltr, E. W. Kenworthy, Exec Secy,
Presidential Committee, to Lee Nichols, 28 Jul 53;
both in CMH files.]

Royall formally proposed a defense-wide experiment in integration to
Forrestal on 2 December. He was not oblivious to the impression his
vacillation on the subject had produced and went to some lengths to
explain why he had opposed such experiments in the past. Although he
had been thinking about such an experiment for some time, he told
Forrestal, he had publicly rejected the idea at the National Defense
Conference and during the Senate hearings on the draft law because of
the tense international situation and the small size of the Army at
that time. His interest in the experiment revived as the size of the
Army increased and similar suggestions were made by both black leaders
and southern politicians, but again he had hesitated, this time
because of the national elections. He was now prepared to go ahead,
but only if similar action were taken by the other services.

The experimental units, he advised Forrestal, should contain both
combat and service elements of considerable size, and he went on to
specify their composition in some detail. The Navy and Marine Corps
should include at least one shore station "where the social problems
for individuals and their families will approximate those confronting
the Army." To insure the experiment's usefulness, he wanted Negroes
employed in all positions, including supervisory ones, for which they
qualified, and he urged that attention be paid to "the problem of
social relations in off-duty hours." He was candid about the plan's
weaknesses. The right to transfer out of the experimental unit might
confine the experiment to white and black troops who wanted it to (p. 329)
succeed; hence any conclusions drawn might be challenged as invalid
since men could not be given the right to exercise similar options in
time of war. Therefore, if the experiment succeeded, it would have to
be followed by another in which no voluntary options were granted. The
experiment might also bring pressure from groups outside the Army, and
if it failed "for any reason" the armed services would be accused of
sabotage, no matter how sincere their