ile.]

The directive reflected Louis Johnson's personality, ambition, and
administrative strategy. If many of his associates questioned his
personal commitment to the principle of integration, or indeed even
his private feeling about President Truman's order, all recognized his
political ambition and penchant for vigorous and direct action.[14-20]
The secretary would recognize the political implications of the
executive order just as he would want to exercise personal control
over integration, an issue fraught with political uncertainties that
an independent presidential committee would only multiply. A dramatic
public statement might well serve Johnson's needs. By creating at
least the illusion of forward motion in the field of race relations, a
directive issued by the Secretary of Defense might neutralize the Fahy
Committee as an independent force, protecting the services from
outside interference while enhancing Johnson's position in the White
House and with the press. A "blustering bully," one of Fahy's
assistants later called Johnson, whose directive was designed, he
charged, to put the Fahy Committee out of business.[14-21]

[Footnote 14-20: This conclusion is based on
Interviews, author with Charles Fahy, 8 Feb 68,
James C. Evans, 6 Apr 69, and Brig Gen Charles T.
Lanham, 10 Jan 71. It is also based on letters to
author from John Ohly, 9 Jan 71, and Thomas Reid,
15 Jan 71. All in CMH.]

[Footnote 14-21: Memo, Kenworthy for Chief of Military
History, 13 Oct 76. CMH.]

If such was his motive, the secretary was taking a chance. (p. 347)
Announcing his directive to the press transformed what could have been
an innocuous, private reaffirmation of the department's pledge of
equal treatment and opportunity into a public exercise in military
policymaking. The Secretary of Defense in effect committed himself to
a public review of the services' racial practices. In this sense the
responses he elicited from the Army and Navy were a disappointment.
Both services contented themselves with an outline of their current
policies and ignored the secretary's request for future plans. The
Army offered statistics to prove that its present program guaranteed
equal opportunity, while the Navy concluded that its practices and
procedures revealed "no inconsistencies" with the