ossibility of deceit, Fahy walked
to a corner of the room and reread the Army's statement in the light
of Davenport's charges. Witnesses would later remember the flush of
anger that came to his face as he read. His committee was going to
have to hear more from Davenport.

[Illustration: CHARLES FAHY _(a later portrait)_.]

If efficiency was to be the keynote of the committee's investigation,
Davenport explained, it would be a simple thing to prove that the Army
was acting inefficiently. In a morning of complex testimony replete
with statistical analysis of the Army's manpower management, he and
Maj. James D. Fowler, a black West Point graduate and personnel
officer, provided the committee with the needed breakthrough. Step by
step they led Fahy and his associates through the complex workings of
the Army's career guidance program, showing them how segregation
caused the inefficient use of manpower on several counts.[14-48] The
Army, for example, as part of a continuing effort to find men who
_could_ be trained for specialties in which it had a shortage of men,
published a monthly list, the so-called "40 Report," of its authorized
and actual strength in each of its 490 military occupational
specialties. Each of these specialties was further broken down by
race. The committee learned that no authorization existed at all for
Negroes in 198 of these specialties, despite the fact that in many of
them the Army was under its authorized strength. Furthermore, for many
of the specialties in which there were no authorizations for Negroes
no great skill was needed. In short, it was the policy of segregated
service that allowed the Army, which had thousands of jobs unfilled
for lack of trained specialists, to continue to deny training and
assignment to thousands of Negroes whose aptitude test scores showed
them at least minimally suited for those jobs. How could the Army
claim that it was operating efficiently when a shortage existed and
potentially capable persons were being ignored?

[Footnote 14-48: Fahy Cmte Hearings, 28 Apr 49,
morning session.]

One question led to another. If there were no authorizations for black
soldiers in 198 specialties, what were the chances for qualified
Negroes to attend schools that trained men for these specialties? It
turned out that of the 106 school courses available after a man
finished basic training, only twenty-one were open to Negroes. That
is, 81 p