roops and the fear that many white soldiers would refuse to
serve with blacks. Many Army leaders were convinced that the
performance of black troops in the past two wars did not qualify
Negroes for a role in the Army's current mission, the execution of
field operations in relatively small groups. These reservations were
expressed frequently in Army testimony. Bradley, in defense of
segregation, for example, cited the performance of the 92d Division.
When asked whether a 15 percent black Army would reduce efficiency, he
said, "from our experience in the past I think the time might come
when it wouldn't, but the average educational standards of these men
would not be up to the average of the white soldier. In modern combat
a man is thrown very much on his own initiative."[14-39] This attitude
was closely related to the Army's estimates of white morale: white
soldiers, the argument ran, especially many among those southerners
who comprised an unusually high proportion of the Army's strength,
would not accept integration. Many white men would refuse to take
orders from black superiors, and the mutual dependence of individual
soldiers and small units in combat would break down when the races
were mingled.

[Footnote 14-39: Ibid., p. 83.]

Although these beliefs were highly debatable, they were tenaciously
held by many senior officials and were often couched in terms that
were extremely difficult to refute. For instance, Royall summed up the
argument on morale: "I am reluctant--and I am sure all sincere
citizens will be reluctant--to force a pace faster than is consistent
with the efficiency and morale of the Army--or to follow a course
inconsistent with the ability of the Army, in the event of war, to
take the battlefield with reasonable assurance of success."[14-40]

[Footnote 14-40: Testimony of the Secretary of the
Army, Fahy Cmte Hearings, 28 Mar 49, morning
session, p. 28.]

But in time the Fahy Committee found a way, first suggested by its
executive secretary, to turn the efficiency argument around. Certainly
a most resourceful and imaginative man, Kenworthy had no doubt about
the immorality of segregation, but he also understood, as he later
told the Secretary of the Army, that whatever might be morally
undeniable in the abstract, military efficiency had to govern in
matters of military policy. His study of the record and his
investigatio