FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   463   464   465   466   467   468   469   470   471   472   473   474   475   476   477   478   479   480   481   482   483   484   485   486   487  
488   489   490   491   492   493   494   495   496   497   498   499   500   501   502   503   504   505   506   507   508   509   510   511   512   >>   >|  
f larger white units. In March 1949 Secretary of the Navy Sullivan reported that with the minor exception of several black depot companies, the largest black units in the Marine Corps were platoons of forty-three men, "and they are integrated with other platoons of whites."[13-69] [Footnote 13-69: Testimony of the Secretary of the Navy Before President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, 28 Mar 49, afternoon session, p. 15.] [Illustration: GENERAL CATES.] The cutback in the size and kinds of black units and the integration of recruit training removed the need for the separate camp at Montford Point, home base for black marines since the beginning of World War II. The camp's last two organizations, a provisional company and a headquarters company, were inactivated on 31 July and 9 September, respectively, thus ending an era in the history of Negroes in the Marine Corps.[13-70] [Footnote 13-70: On the closing of Montford Point, see Interv, Blumenson with Sgt Max Rousseau, Admin Chief, G-1 Div, USMC (former member of the Montford Point Camp headquarters), 21 Feb 66, CMH files.] Composite grouping of small black units usually provided for separate assignment and segregated facilities. As late as February 1949, the commandant made clear he had no intention of allowing the corps to drift into a _de facto_ integration policy. When, for example, it came to his attention that some commanders were restricting appointment of qualified black marines to specialist schools on the grounds that their commands lacked billets for black specialists, the commandant reiterated the principle that assignment to specialty training was to be made without regard to race. At the same time he emphasized that this policy was not to be construed as an endorsement of the use of black specialists in white units. General Cates specifically stipulated that where no billets in their specialty or a related one were available for black specialists in black units, his headquarters was to be informed. The implication of this order was obvious to the Division of Plans and Policies. "This is an important one," a division official commented, "it involves finding billets for Negro specialists even if we have to create a unit to do it."[13-71] It was also obvious
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   463   464   465   466   467   468   469   470   471   472   473   474   475   476   477   478   479   480   481   482   483   484   485   486   487  
488   489   490   491   492   493   494   495   496   497   498   499   500   501   502   503   504   505   506   507   508   509   510   511   512   >>   >|  



Top keywords:
specialists
 

headquarters

 

Montford

 

billets

 

Footnote

 

policy

 
integration
 
company
 

training

 
obvious

marines

 

Secretary

 
assignment
 

specialty

 

separate

 

commandant

 

platoons

 

Marine

 
lacked
 
schools

grounds

 

specialist

 
commands
 
intention
 

allowing

 

February

 

segregated

 
facilities
 

commanders

 

restricting


appointment

 

attention

 

qualified

 

emphasized

 
division
 

official

 
commented
 

involves

 
important
 

Division


Policies

 

finding

 

create

 
implication
 

provided

 

construed

 

principle

 

regard

 

endorsement

 
related