meet Davenport,
particularly since the chairman was inclined to be impressed with, and
optimistic over, the Army's response to Johnson's directive of 6 April
1949. Fahy, Kenworthy knew, was unfamiliar with military language and
the fine art practiced by military staffs of stating a purpose in
technical jargon that would permit various interpretations. There was
no fanfare, no dramatic scene. Kenworthy simply invited Fahy and
Davenport, along with the black officers assigned by the services to
assist the committee, to meet informally at his home one evening in
April.[14-47]

[Footnote 14-47: This incident is described in detail
in Interviews, author with Fahy; Davenport, 17 Oct
71; and E. W. Kenworthy (by telephone), 1 Dec 71.
See also Interv, Nichols with Davenport, in Nichols
Collection. All in CMH.]

Never one to waste time, Fahy summarized the committee's activities
thus far, outlined its dealings with Army witnesses, and then handed
out copies of the Army's response to Secretary Johnson's directive.
Fahy was inclined to recommend approval, a course agreed to by the
black officers present, but he nevertheless turned courteously to the
personnel expert from the Department of the Army and asked him for his
opinion of the official Army position. Davenport did not hesitate.
"The directive [the Army's response to Secretary Johnson's 6 April
directive] isn't worth the paper it's written on," he answered. It
called for sweeping changes in the administration of the Army's
training programs, he explained, but would produce no change because
personnel specialists at the training centers would quickly discover
that their existing procedures, which excluded so many qualified black
soldiers, would fit quite comfortably under the document's idealistic
but vague language. The Army's response, Davenport declared, had been
very carefully drawn up to retain segregation rather than to end it.

Chairman Fahy seemed annoyed by this declaration. After all, he had
listened intently to the Army's claims and promises and was inclined
to accept the Army's proposal as a slow, perhaps, but certain way to
bring about racial integration. He was, however, a tough-minded
man and was greatly impressed by the analysis of the situation (p. 354)
presented by the Army employee. When Davenport asked him to reexamine
the directive with eyes open to the p