take comfort in the relatively mild
reaction from conservative blacks, an important element of the black
community supported Randolph's stand. A poll of young educated Negroes
conducted by the NAACP revealed that 71 percent of those of draft age
would support the civil disobedience campaign. So impressive was
Randolph's support--the New York _Times_ called it a blunt warning
from the black public--that one news journal saw in the campaign the
specter of a major national crisis.[12-41] On the other hand, the
Washington _Post_ cautioned its readers not to exaggerate the
significance of the protest. Randolph's words, the _Post_ declared,
were intended "more as moral pressure" for nondiscrimination clauses
in pending draft and universal military training legislation than as a
serious threat.[12-42]

[Footnote 12-41: New York _Times_, April 1, 1948.]

[Footnote 12-42: Washington _Post_, April 2, 1948.]

Whatever its ultimate influence on national policy, the Randolph civil
disobedience pledge had no visible effect on the position of the
President or Congress. With a draft bill and a national political
convention pending, the President was not about to change his
hands-off policy toward the segregation issue in the services. In fact
he showed some heat at what he saw as a threat by extremists to
exploit an issue he claimed he was doing his best to resolve.[12-43] As
for members of Congress, most of those who joined in the debate on the
draft bill simply ignored the threatened boycott.

[Footnote 12-43: McCoy and Ruetten, _Quest and
Response_, p. 107.]

In contrast to the militant Randolph, the Negroes who gathered at
Secretary Forrestal's invitation for the National Defense Conference
on 26 April appeared to be a rather sedate group. But academic honors,
business success, and gray hairs were misleading. These eminent
educators, clergymen, and civil rights leaders proved just as (p. 305)
determined as Randolph and his associates to be rid of segregation
and, considering their position in the community, were more likely to
influence the administration. That they were their own men quickly
became apparent in the stormy course of the Pentagon meeting. They
subjected a score of defense officials[12-44] to searching questions,
submitted themselves to cross-examination by the press, and agreed to
prepare a report for the Secretary of Defense.