ions of the segregation fight were a prime concern of every
politician involved, and Forrestal had to act with this fact in mind.
The administration considered the Wallace campaign a real but minor
threat because of his appeal to black voters in the early months of
the campaign.[12-50] The Republican incursion into the civil rights field
was more ominous, and Forrestal, having acknowledged Lodge's letter,
turned to Lester Granger for help in drafting a detailed reply. It
took Granger some time to suggest an approach because he agreed with
Lodge on many points but found some of his inferences as unsound as
the Army's policy. For instance Lodge approved Eisenhower's comments
on segregation, and the only real difference between Eisenhower and
the Army staff was that Eisenhower wanted segregation made more
efficient by putting smaller all-black units into racially composite
organizations. Negroes opposed segregation as an insult to their race
and to their manhood. Granger wanted Forrestal to tell Lodge that no
group of Negroes mindful of its public standing could take a position
other than total opposition to segregation. Having to choose between
Randolph's stand and Eisenhower's, Negroes could not endorse
Eisenhower. Granger also thought Forrestal would do well to explain to
Lodge that he himself favored for the other services the policy
followed by the Navy in the name of improving efficiency and
morale.[12-51]

[Footnote 12-50: McCoy and Ruetten, _Quest and
Response_, pp. 98-99.]

[Footnote 12-51: Ltr, Granger to Leva, 14 May 48,
D54-1-3, SecDef files.]

A reply along these line was prepared, but Marx Leva persuaded (p. 308)
Forrestal not to send it until the selective service bill had safely
passed Congress.[12-52] Forrestal was "seriously concerned," he wrote
the President on 28 May 1948, about the fate of that legislation. He
wanted to express his opposition to an amendment proposed by Senator
Richard B. Russell of Georgia that would guarantee segregated units
for those draftees who wished to serve only with members of their own
race. He also wanted to announce his intention of making "further
progress" in interracial relations. To that end he had discussed with
Special Counsel to the President Clark M. Clifford the creation of an
advisory board to recommend specific steps his department could take
in the race relations field. Reiterati