word to describe
the complex social change in the armed forces demanded by civil rights
leaders, and the emphasis on equality of treatment and opportunity with
its portent for the next generation was particularly appropriate.
Truman, however, was not allowed to remain vague for long. (p. 313)
Questioned at his first press conference after the order was issued, the
President refused to set a time limit, but he admitted that he expected
the order to abolish racial segregation in the armed forces.[12-69]
The order was also misleading when it created the advisory committee
"in" the National Military Establishment. Truman apparently intended
to create a presidential committee to oversee the manpower policies of
all the services, and despite the wording of the order the committee
would operate as a creature of the White House, reporting to the
President rather than to the Secretary of Defense.

[Footnote 12-69: Presidential News Conference, 29 Jul
48, _Public Papers of the President_, 1948, p.
422.]

The success of the new policy would depend to a great extent, as
friends and foes of integration alike recognized, on the ability and
inclination of this committee. The final choice of members was the
President's, but he conspicuously involved the Democratic National
Committee, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army. He
repeatedly solicited Forrestal's suggestions, and it was apparent that
the views of the Pentagon would carry much weight in the final
selection. Just four days after the publication of Executive Order
9981, the President's administrative assistant, Donald S. Dawson,
wrote Forrestal that he would be glad to talk to him about the seven
members.[12-70] Before Forrestal replied he had Leva discuss possible
nominees with the three military departments and obtain their
recommendations. The Pentagon's list went to the White House on 3
August. A list compiled subsequently by Truman's advisers, chiefly
Philleo Nash and Oscar Ewing, and approved by the Democratic National
Committee, duplicated a number of Forrestal's suggestions; its
additions and deletions revealed the practical political
considerations under which the White House had to operate.[12-71]

[Footnote 12-70: Ltr, Dawson to Forrestal, 30 Jul 48,
SecDef files.]

[Footnote 12-71: Memos, Leva for Forrestal, 3 and 12