cess worth proclaiming
in his first eight months of office.

This lack of progress disappointed civil rights leaders, who had
perhaps overestimated the racial reforms made when Forrestal was
Secretary of the Navy. It can be argued that as Secretary of Defense
Forrestal himself was inclined to overestimate them. Nevertheless, he
could demonstrate some systematic improvement in the lot of the black
sailor, enough improvement, according to his gradualist philosophy, to
assure continued progress. Ironically, considering Forrestal's faith
in the efficacy of education and persuasion, whatever can be counted
as his success in the Navy was accomplished by the firm authority he
and his immediate subordinates exercised during the last months of (p. 309)
the war. Yet this authority was precisely what he lacked in his new
office, where his power was limited to only a general control over
intransigent services that still insisted on their traditional
autonomy.

In any case, by 1948 there was no hope for widespread reform through a
step-by-step demonstration of the practicality and reasonableness of
integration. Too much of the remaining opposition was emotional,
rooted in prejudice and tradition, to yield to any but forceful
methods. If the services were to be integrated in the short run,
integration would have to be forced upon them.

_Executive Order 9981_

Although politics was only one of several factors that led to
Executive Order 9981, the order was born during a presidential
election campaign, and its content and timing reflect that fact.
Having made what could be justified as a military decision in the
interest of a more effective use of manpower in the armed forces, the
President and his advisers sought to capitalize on the political
benefits that might accrue from it.[12-56] The work of the President's
Committee on Civil Rights and Truman's subsequent message to Congress
had already elevated civil rights to the level of a major campaign
issue. As early as November 1947 Clark Clifford, predicting the
nomination of Thomas Dewey and Henry Wallace, had advised the
President to concentrate on winning the allegiance of the nation's
minority voters, especially the black, labor, and Jewish blocs.[12-57]
Clifford had discounted the threat of a southern defection, but in the
spring of 1948 southern Democrats began to turn from the party, and
the black vote, an important element in the big city Democratic vote
since the forma