ise of the affections, a most important influence is
produced by Attention, aided by a certain act of imagination. This
consists of directing the mind intensely and habitually to all the
considerations which ought to guide us in the particular relation to
which the affection refers. It leads us to place ourselves in the
situation of others, and, with a kind of personal, or almost selfish
interest, to enter into their wants, their anxieties, and their
feelings; and thus, in their place, to judge of the emotions and the
conduct which are due from us to them. Such is the exercise of one who
wishes to follow the great rule of doing to others as he would that they
should do to him. He is not satisfied with the merely decent discharge
of the duties which arise from the affections, but studies intensely the
requirements which attach to his particular situation,--searches out
the individuals, towards whom they ought to be exercised, and enters
into their condition and their feelings with minute and tender interest.
Many who shew no want of friendly and benevolent affection, when an
individual case is strongly brought before them, are deficient in the
kind of exercise which would lead them, in this manner, to find their
way to that correct exercise of the affections which really belongs to a
scene of moral discipline. Such an exercise is adapted to every
situation in life, and tends to guard a man, in his various relations,
against the hindrances which indolence, self-love, and pure inattention
are apt to bring in the way of his peculiar duties,--and of his
discharging them with due regard to the feelings of others.

This mental exercise, of extensive application to the benevolent
affections, constitutes what is usually called _Sympathy_. It is
composed of an act of Imagination and Self-love, by which we transfer
ourselves, as it were, into the situation of other men, and thereby
regulate our conduct towards them. It is however to be kept in mind,
that the principle of self-love, thus brought into action, is the test,
not the rule of our conduct. This is a point on which there has been
much vague and useless speculation; and from not attending to the
distinction, some have referred our ideas of benevolence entirely to the
principle of selfishness. Such discussions are equally unsound and
unprofitable, and are to be placed on a footing with the speculations of
the scholastic philosophy, which we now look back upon merely as matter