s the result of a treacherous collusion
between Athens and the Central Powers,[9] M. Venizelos roused the
Allied nations to fury. Their Governments, of course, knew better.
Even in France official persons recognized that the occupation of Rupel
was a defensive operation which Greece could not oppose by force. Yet
they had hoped that she would have averted it by diplomatic action. As
it was, they concluded that she must have received from the Central
Powers very strong assurances that the occupied territories would be
restored to her. In any case, they said, the Skouloudis Cabinet's
passivity in face of a move calculated to prejudice the Allies'
military position contradicted its oft-repeated protestations of a
benevolent neutrality towards them.[10]

M. Skouloudis hastened to vindicate his conduct. He did not tell the
Entente Powers, as he might have done, that he had by diplomatic action
put off an invasion for six months, and thus enabled them to increase
their forces and consolidate their position. Neither did he tell them
another thing which in itself formed an ample refutation of the charge
of collusion--that on 27 April (10 May) General Sarrail had occupied
the frontier fort Dova-tepe with the tacit consent of the Hellenic
Government, which had deliberately excluded that fort from the
instructions of resistance issued that day to its troops, and that
Greek officers urged him at the same time to occupy Rupel, dwelling on
the military importance of the fort for the defence of Eastern
Macedonia; an advice which the French General had ignored on the ground
that Rupel lay altogether outside the Allies' zone of action, and he
could not spare the troops necessary for its occupation.[11]

{100}

The Greek Premier simply said that his Government's passivity was in
strict accord with the explicit declarations of its policy and
intentions, enunciated at the very outset, ratified by the Agreement of
10 December, 1915, and reiterated _ad nauseam_ to the Entente
Ministers--viz., that "should the Allied troops by their movements
bring the war into Greek territory, the Greek troops would withdraw so
as to leave the field free to the two parties to settle their
differences." Far from changing his attitude, he once more, in reply
to M. Briand's threat that, "if the Bulgarian advance continued without
resistance there might ensue the most serious consequences for the
Hellenic Government," emphatically declared: "Resistance