indri. La Grece, dont les
officiers et les soldats ne veulent pas se battre, est avec
Constantin._"--Mermeix, _Le Commandement Unique_, Part II, p. 60.
[21] Romanos, Paris, 14/27, 15/28 Sept.; Carapanos to Greek Legation,
Paris, 15/28 Sept., 1916.
[22] Romanos, Paris, 16/29, 17/30 Sept.; Gennadius, London, 17/30 Sept.,
1916.
[23] See "Message from M. Venizelos," in _The Times_, 27 Sept., 1916.
[24] The _Daily Telegraph_, 5 Oct., 1916.
[25] The _Daily Telegraph_, 7 Oct., 1916.
[26] The authentic history of the Venizelos family begins with our hero's
father; his grandfather is a probable hypothesis: the remoter ancestors
with whom, since his rise to fame, he has been endowed by enthusiastic
admirers in Western Europe, are purely romantic. In Greece, where nearly
everyone's origin is involved in obscurity, matters of this sort possess
little interest, and M. Venizelos's Greek biographers dwell only on his
ascent.
[27] For one side of this affair see _Memorandum de S.A.R. Le Prince
Georges de Grece, Haut Commissaire en Crete, aux Quatre Grandes
Puissances Protectrices de la Crete_, 1905. The other side has been
expounded in many publications: among them, _E. Venizelos: His Life, His
Work_. By Costa Kairophyla, pp. 37-65; _Eleutherios Venizelos_. By K.
K. Kosmides, pp. 14-16.
[28] See _The Times_, 27 Sept.; _The Eleutheros Typos_, 23 Oct. (O.S.),
1916.
[29] Du Fournet, p. 176.
[30] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917.
{139}
CHAPTER XIII
M. Venizelos had unfurled the standard of rebellion in the true spirit
of his temperament and traditions. To him civil war had nothing
repulsive about it: it was a normal procedure--a ladder to power.
Naturally, he persuaded others, and perhaps himself, that he acted
purely with the patriotic intention of devoting to the public benefit
the power which, for that purpose only, it became his duty to usurp.
Moved by the ambition to aggrandize Greece, he felt at liberty to use
whatever means might conduce to so desirable an end. The sole question
that troubled him was, whether this old ladder would serve him as
faithfully as in the past. And once again the answer depended on the
attitude of the "Protecting Powers."
Those Powers had hitherto blundered in all their Balkan dealings with
depressing uniformity. First came the mistake about Bulgaria. The
hate of the Greeks for the Bulgars was a psychological force which,
properly estimated and utilized, co
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