such in the Greek question, as already
explained, did not exist.
At Athens the action of the Allies was less open to the criticism of
tameness.
After a life of three weeks passed in fruitless efforts to enter into
relations with the Entente Powers, even by proposing to discard the
Ministers obnoxious to them, the Calogeropoulos Cabinet resigned (4
Oct.), and King Constantine, having exhausted his stock of politicians,
sought a candidate for the Premiership in circles which, remote from
party intrigue, might have been thought immune from suspicion.
Professor Lambros, who accepted the {141} mandate (8 Oct.), was known
as a grave savant, generally esteemed for his kindly nature as much as
for his intellectual eminence and administrative capacity. But
Professor Lambros laboured under the universal disability of not being
a Venizelist. Therefore, he was "believed to be Germanophile," and it
was "questionable whether his Cabinet will be recognized by the Entente
Powers." [3] However, in less than a week, he "established contact"
with their representatives. It was "contact" in a sense of the term
more familiar to soldiers than to statesmen.
On 10 October Admiral Dartige de Fournet resumed his activities by
launching on the Hellenic Government an Ultimatum. Greece was
summoned, within twenty-four hours, to disarm her big ships, to hand
over to him all her light ships intact, and to disarm all her coast
batteries, except three which were to be occupied by the Allies. In
addition, the port of the Piraeus, the railways, and the police were to
be placed under Allied control.
The demand for her Fleet, Greece was told, arose from uneasiness about
the safety of the Allied armada--a pretext that exposed itself: the
Greek Fleet consisted of only five battleships dating from 1891-2,
except one whose date was 1908; two cruisers, dating from 1911 and
1914; and a microscopic light flotilla. "To see there a serious
danger, it would be puerile," says Admiral Dartige himself; and far
from feeling elated at the success of the operation, he tells us that
he "suffered at being constrained by events to use force against a
neutral and weak nation." But he had to do it: though not a matter to
be proud of, it was a precaution not altogether unjustifiable. He
could, however, neither justify nor qualify the other measures. They
involved, he says, a high-handed encroachment on the internal affairs
of the country--an abuse of power pur
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