t wrote of him: "In the Chamber he is highly esteemed.
Although he is a Theotokist, and {125} therefore anti-Venizelist, M.
Calogeropoulos, who studied in France, declared to me that all his
personal sympathies are with the Entente. He is likewise a member of the
Franco-Greek League." [1] In harmony with this character was his
programme: "The new Cabinet, inspired by the same policy as M. Zaimis, is
resolved to pursue it with the sincere desire to tighten the bonds
between Greece and the Entente Powers." This declaration, made in every
Allied capital, was supplemented by a more intimate announcement in Paris
and London: "Sharing the views which inspired the negotiations opened by
its predecessor, the Royal Government is resolved to pursue them in the
same spirit." [2]

No sooner had M. Calogeropoulos spoken than M. Venizelos set to work to
cast doubts on his sincerity, with remarkable success: "M. Venizelos does
not believe that the composition of the new Ministry permits of the hope
that a national policy will be adopted, since it springs from a party of
pro-German traditions," [3]--this ominous paragraph was added by the
_Times_ Correspondent to his report the same day. And next day the
British Minister, in an interview with the editor of a Venizelist
journal, said: "The situation is certainly not an agreeable one. I have
read in the papers the declaration of the new Premier. What has
surprised me is to find that M. Calogeropoulos characterized his Ministry
as a political one, whereas in their last Note the Allies required that
Greece should be governed by a business Cabinet. This, as you see, makes
a distinct difference." [4] Simultaneously, the Entente Press, under
similar inspiration, reviled the new Cabinet as pro-German, clamoured for
M. Venizelos, whom they still represented as the true exponent of the
national will, threatened King Constantine with the fate of King Otho,
and his country with "terrible and desperate things." [5]

{126}

It was in such an atmosphere that M. Calogeropoulos and his colleagues
attempted to resume the conversations which M. Zaimis had opened. They
realized that, since elections and like legal methods no longer commended
themselves to the Allies, since they menaced the country with "terrible
and desperate things," Greece might drift into chaos at any moment. They
were anxious to avoid chaos. But how? A blind acceptance of the
Venizelist policy of an immediate rush into th