eady to give his support and that of his party to a Government which
would declare war on Bulgaria, and that he asked neither to preside over
such a Government nor to be represented in it by his partisans. As a
patriot and a statesman, seeking only his country's welfare," etc., etc.,
etc. But--"the principal followers of M. Venizelos do not believe that
this new step taken by the authorities at Athens indicates a change in
the right direction in the councils of the Palace. They maintain that
the idea behind this _demarche_ is simply to gain time. I have pressed
M. Venizelos on this, and, although he did not wish to appear to be as
emphatic as his followers, he had to admit to me that he had no illusions
and that he remained sceptical. If King Constantine is really {133}
sincere, he can give a proof which will allay all doubts. Let him order
a mobilization at once . . . and call in M. Venizelos to form a new
Government." [24]

King Constantine, instead of treating the Cretan as a rebel, still wished
to treat him as a responsible citizen, and by his moderation to give him
an opportunity of a decent return to legal order. But he could not, even
if he wished, call to power a man in open revolt: by so doing he would
alienate the loyal majority without conciliating the disloyal minority.

After thus burning the last boat that might have carried him back to
legality, M. Venizelos took the first boat that travelled in the opposite
direction. He left Suda Bay on 5 October, amidst the cheers of the
Allied squadrons, bound for Salonica by way of Samos and Mytilene. At
Samos he received a fresh token of the approval with which the Entente
viewed his operations: the commander of a British man-of-war, acting on
instructions, officially called on him and paid his respects.[25]

And so he reached Salonica, took up his abode at the royal residence, and
with Admiral Coundouriotis and General Danglis composed a Triumvirate
which, having appointed a Ministry, began to levy taxes and troops, and
to negotiate for a loan.

The metamorphosis of a Prime Minister into an insurgent chief, though a
remarkable phenomenon, is no matter for surprise. M. Venizelos sprang
from people among whom insurrection formed the traditional method of
asserting political opinions. His father was a veteran of the Greek
Revolution of 1821, and passed most of his life plotting. His
grandfather is supposed to have been a refugee of the earlier Greek
rev