ugurated by the Allied Governments in June. At the
news of the Bulgarian invasion, the French Minister at Athens felt or
feigned unbounded fear--_tout etait a redoubter_: even a raid by Uhlans
to the very gates of the capital--and asked Paris for a squadron to be
placed at his disposal. Paris did what it could. On 26 August Admiral
Dartige du Fournet was ordered to form a special squadron and proceed
against Athens according to the plans drawn up {111} in June. He
immediately left Malta at the head of thirty-four ships, and on the
28th arrived at Milo, where he found a British contingent of
thirty-nine ships awaiting him. The joint armada thus formed was
believed to be strong enough to preclude all danger of resistance. For
all that, every precaution was taken to secure to it the advantage of a
surprise, though in vain: its size and the proximity of its objective
rendered secrecy impossible.

Four days were wasted in idleness--a delay due to England's scruples.
But at last all was ready; and on the morning of 1 September the Allied
Fleet stood out to sea: seventy-three units of every description, the
big ships in single file, flanked by torpedo-boats, steaming bravely at
the rate of fifteen knots, and leaving behind them a track of
white-crested waves that stretched to the very edge of the horizon: _le
coup d'oeil est impressionant_.

All arrangements for battle had been made, and each contingent had its
special role assigned to it: only the Intelligence Services, being
otherwise occupied, had failed to furnish any information about Greek
mines and submarines. It was therefore necessary to be more than ever
careful. But the six hours' voyage was accomplished safely, and not
until the armada cast anchor at the mouth of the Salamis Strait did it
meet with a tangible token of hostility. The Greek Admiral commanding
the Royal Fleet before the arsenal of Salamis--a force composed of two
ironclads, one armoured cruiser, eighteen torpedo-boats and two
submarines--failed to bid the Allies welcome: a breach of international
rules which was duly resented and remedied.

The expedition had for its objects: (1) To seize a dozen enemy
merchantmen which had taken refuge since the beginning of the War in
the harbours of Eleusis and the Piraeus; (2) to obtain the control of
Greek posts and telegraphs; (3) to procure the expulsion of enemy
propagandists, and the prosecution of such Greek subjects as had
rendered themselves gu