ome very difficult, and emphasizing the sorrow which the Greek
people felt at seeing its independence fettered.[8]

England found this declaration satisfactory; but before answering it
definitely, she must take counsel with her allies.[9] France, by the
mouth of M. Briand, pronounced the allusion to friendly relations with
all the belligerents unfortunate: she was unable to understand how
Greece could maintain friendly relations with Germany and even with
Bulgaria after the occupation of Eastern Macedonia.[10] And so, having
taken counsel together, the Allies set forth their views in a tardy
reply to King Constantine's last offer. The gist of it was contained
in this phrase: "The Greek Government has several times since the
beginning of the War offered to come in on our side; but its offers,
and particularly the last one, were accompanied by conditions which
rendered them unacceptable." The Entente Powers added that they did
not want Greece, unless she declared, on her own initiative, war
against Bulgaria. It was the only way to gain their confidence.[11]

In other words, Greece should take the field without any agreement, so
that she should have no claims either to adequate support during the
war or to compensations at the conclusion of peace: nay, it was even
hoped in Paris and London that Bulgaria might yet be seduced from the
Central Powers, and in that case not only would Greece gain nothing in
Thrace, but might very likely lose a portion of Macedonia.[12] It was
the old story--to which King Constantine could never listen. He would
suffer anything rather than plunge his country into war without even an
assurance of its territorial integrity. When at this juncture a
well-intentioned adviser warned him that his policy might cost him his
throne, he answered promptly: "I do not care about my throne. I only
think of Greece." [13]

{145}

At the same time, there was little he would not do to remove those
fears and suspicions which were perpetually pleaded as reasons for
coercion. The surrender of the Fleet had allayed once for all the
Allies' uneasiness about their forces at sea. There remained their
uneasiness about their forces on land. In spite of his repeated
declarations that under no circumstances would Greece take up a hostile
attitude, the King was credited with a treacherous design--to mass in
Thessaly 80,000 men, lay up munitions and provisions, wait until the
Allied Army should march on Monasti