ory; the use of isles and ports as naval bases. Then the
landing of the Allies in Macedonia {150} had inaugurated a period of
continuous violations of neutrality and the establishment of a regime
of terror towards them: their Consuls were arrested, members of their
Legations were assaulted, great numbers of their nationals were led
into captivity or driven into exile, their merchant ships were seized,
and the Ministers themselves were deprived of all means of
communicating with their Governments. Last of all came the
installation of Allied troops in Athens itself and the sequestration of
the Greek navy, now transformed into a definite cession; and,
according to trustworthy intelligence, the Entente Powers meant to
exact shortly the disarmament of the Greek army also. They ended with
a hint that the indulgence of their Governments might reach its
limit.[28]

A more painful position for a free people and its rulers could not be
imagined. But King Constantine comforted himself with the thought that
the "pledges of friendship" exacted from him by the Allies would be
followed by corresponding pledges from them. His negotiation with M.
Benazet had received its finishing touches in the evening of 7
November: the Entente Powers would present to the Greek Government a
Note setting forth their demands in the form of a "Summons," the terms
of which were, word for word, agreed upon between the two parties. By
this document the Allies bound themselves "to repeal the coercive
measures taken up to now and never to tolerate that armed Greek bodies
which had declared to have as their sole aim a struggle for the
vindication of national ideas should turn aside from that aim in order
to engage in acts of sedition." [29]

This clause formed the corner-stone of the whole pact. "It is clear,"
telegraphs M. Benazet to Paris, "that some sort of compensation is
admitted in principle,"--for very good reasons: "The King's sole
fear--and a very intelligible one--is lest his own arms should be
handed over to Greeks who would use them to march on Athens and
overthrow his dynasty." Moreover, without such guarantees it will be
impossible for the King and his Premier "to make disarmament acceptable
by the Royalist Party, {151} which constitutes the great majority of
the nation." He added that neither the King nor his Premier was
unaware of the hostility with which these efforts for conciliation were
viewed by certain personalities: but both