7th of September, an officer of the garrison,
by personal observation at Boshof in the Free State, ascertained that
the burghers of the latter had been ordered out. The works were then
pressed forward, and the formation of citizens into town guards
already planned, was begun; 1,156 combatant members being enrolled,
and placed under drill by non-commissioned officers of {p.138} the
regular battalion in garrison. The Boer forces continued to approach
Kimberley, and on October 4, a week before war began, advanced bodies
were within twelve miles. By October 7 the earthworks were so far
forward that Kekewich considered the place practically safe against
any attempt on the part of the enemy to rush it suddenly.
When the ultimatum expired, October 11, the garrison proper consisted
of 570 Imperial and 630 colonial troops, for the defence of an
unwalled town which contained 40,000 inhabitants and, being built in
rambling fashion, had a very long circuit--about eleven miles--to be
guarded. The ready co-operation of the citizens in military duty, both
those already belonging to volunteer bodies and those not previously
organised, but now enrolling themselves for the purpose, alone made
the defence possible. From them, particularly, was formed a corps of
irregular horse, which filled the want of mounted troops that at first
was severely felt. Colonel Kekewich, recognising the enemy's
overpowering superiority of numbers, rapidly drew {p.139} into
Kimberley all the outlying forces of every character under his
command.
Although deeply concerned for the safety of the Modder River bridge,
upon which in a measure would depend the advance of a relief column,
"I was most anxious," he says, "that no disposition of troops made by
me should give the enemy a chance of scoring a first success, even
where the smallest body of British troops might be concerned. Taking
into consideration that the enemy would probably not regulate his
movements in accordance with the dictates of sound strategy, that he
was in possession of mobile artillery in my immediate neighbourhood, I
felt that if I had detached a small body of troops, necessarily
without artillery, which it was not in my power to support from
Kimberley, the enemy would in all probability concentrate very
superior numbers, with artillery, against the small British post, and
endeavour to destroy the troops composing the same. It was principally
for this reason that I determined to concentrat
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