stimated to have been
2,000 to 2,500 men, the kopjes affording them three lines of defence
in successive ridges.
Although the error in direction had necessitated a change in the
method of attack, the {p.149} time had been exact; the line had
started at 3 A.M., reaching the foot of the hills before daybreak.
This could scarcely have been much later than 4 A.M., for in the
southern hemisphere summer was near. The musketry fire of the Boers
opened soon after, "and the troops instinctively moved toward the
enemy's position." The advance was covered by artillery, which,
however, was slow in its movements, "the horses not having yet
recovered from a five weeks' voyage." Criticism has said that the
artillery was not sufficiently employed to silence the enemy's
riflemen, but Lord Methuen alleges that shrapnel does not kill men in
kopjes; "it only frightens them, and I intend to get at my enemy." The
inferiority of shrapnel to shell, in use against kopjes, has been
asserted by many observers. For these various reasons the battle of
Belmont reduced itself to a magnificent charge by a much superior
force up a stony and precipitous hill against an enemy strongly
intrenched. "At 6.10 the last height was cleared, the enemy in large
numbers galloping into the plain, their laager trekking across me
3,000 yards off, {p.150} my mounted troops unable to carry out their
orders on one side--left--because the retreat was covered by kopjes,
and on the other--right--because too far; the artillery dead beat and
unable to help me. A cavalry brigade and a horse artillery battery
from my right would have made good my success." The British loss at
Belmont was 53 killed, 275 wounded; that of the Boers is not
accurately known.
Two days later at Graspan the Boers were in about the same force and
the natural conditions similar in general character. The Boer line
extended east and west, and at the latter end--their right--were "two
high hills." These were bombarded with shrapnel, the effect of which
was more thoroughly tested, one battery alone firing 500 rounds to
clear the summit, before the infantry were allowed to advance. The men
again fought their way to the top, but again the enemy got away. "The
heights gained, I found I had taken the whole Boer force in flank, and
had entirely cut them off from their line of retreat. My guns played
on the masses of horsemen, but my few cavalry, dead beat, were
{p.151} powerless, and for the second time I l
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