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nt military exigency, but also the considerations above mentioned, were present in his mind, as indeed they could not fail to be with any instructed and intelligent officer. "Natal was the object on which the Boers had set their hearts. It was not only the actual point which they attacked, but it was also their sentimental object. They had the idea that they had a right in Natal, and their plan of campaign was framed from the very idea that they should have the territory from Majuba to the sea. But Ladysmith stood in their way, and he might say that Ladysmith was a most important town in northern Natal. From its geographical position it became of great strategical importance. It was at Ladysmith that {p.181} the forces of the Transvaal, pouring over the northern and north-eastern passes of Natal, first joined with the forces that came in from the west and the Orange Free State, and there the two South African Republics combined in their strength under the late Commandant-General Joubert--a man who, he would like to say there, was a brave and a very civilised man. Ladysmith was also a railway centre of great importance, and it was therefore of great value to them to keep it out of the possession of the enemy."[14] [Footnote 14: London _Weekly Times_, May 18.] Nor was this all, as touching the place itself. That similar reasonings had led the Imperial authorities, antecedent to the hostilities, to choose Ladysmith as a depot and _place d'armes_, is shown by the reproaches addressed to the Government by the London _Times_, November 21, 1899: "There is no need to inquire just now into the balance of political and military considerations which determined the policy of making a stand at Ladysmith. It is enough that that policy was definitely adopted in ample time to allow of providing Ladysmith with the long-range guns which its {p.182} position renders peculiarly necessary, dominated as it is by hills on three sides. Why were such guns not provided? Why was it left to fortunate accident to furnish the garrison at the very last moment with the means of defence"--by the arrival of the naval guns? In like manner the prime minister of Natal, some months later, challenged the following statement of the _Times_ in its issue of March 2, 1900: "From November 2, when, owing to the subordination of military to local political considerations, a British force of 10,000 fine soldiers was shut in Ladysmith, a grea
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