m--"One of the hardest and most trying {p.160} fights in the
annals of the British Army." Yet, as far as result was concerned, it
was an immense expenditure of ammunition and little loss of life. The
frontal attack was so clearly impossible that it was at once
abandoned, and the men lay down. A generation or two ago they would
have persisted, many more would have been killed, and while the
position might at last have been carried in front, more than likely it
would at the last have been turned, as it was at the Modder. The
British loss, 70 killed, 413 wounded, was but 7 per cent. of the
troops engaged--about 7,000--far below that of many of Wellington's
battles.
In point of tactics, the battle may be summarized by saying that the
British line held the enemy in front until a couple of detachments, by
daring rushes, had established themselves in positions of command on
the western flank, whence they worked themselves round, crossed the
river, and fairly turned the hostile flank. And that, so stated, is a
very old story. On the other hand, at Belmont and Graspan, at Talana
Hill and Elandslaagte, it was shown that the same arms of rapid fire
{p.161} do not necessarily control where precision and skill, not mere
torrential volume, are needed. Not only is it not demonstrated that
modern weapons can stop the uphill advance of a resolute infantry on
broken ground; it has been shown to probability that they are
incapable of so doing. Whether such charges are wise is one thing, but
whether they are possible is another. Rapidity of fire has reversed
conditions where rapidity is the essential factor; it has not reversed
them, probably not greatly modified them, where skill and resolution
are chiefly demanded.
After the Modder fight Lord Methuen remained at the position then won,
establishing a pontoon bridge, restoring that of the railroad, and
awaiting reinforcements to replace the men lost in battle and those
necessarily detached to protect his lengthening line of
communications. After three severe actions he had now traversed
forty-five of the seventy miles that lay between the Orange River and
Kimberley; but the inadequacy of his numbers was increasingly felt.
During the ten or twelve days at the Modder a serious demonstration
was made in his rear at Enslin, threatening {p.162} the railroad and
his communications. Although successfully repelled, it was evident
that the enemy's concentration had made them so far superior as
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