approached for the relief of Kimberley, the forces
about Naauwport grew larger and more restless than ever. Advance in
menacing force was made not only toward Colesberg, but to the
eastward, along the railroad to Steynsburg and Stormberg. Parties of
colonial horse crossed the country from Gatacre at Sterkstrom to
French and Kelly-Kenny at Steynsburg and Arundel. A general advance in
force seemed imminent. On February 2 French, in closing his long
report to Lord Roberts detailing the events since December 16, said,
"In accordance with the instructions received at Cape Town from the
commander-in-chief, I am now making the arrangements ordered." The
explanation {p.176} of this mysterious allusion appeared thirteen
days later, when, on February 15, he led the relieving column into
Kimberley, two hundred miles distant. The same day his former command,
weakened by his own withdrawal with the cavalry, and by that of
Kelly-Kenny's division, and now under General Clements, had been
forced out of Arundel by greatly superior numbers; but to what avail?
Yet in another ten days the Boers from Kimberley to Colesberg were in
full retreat, and on February 26 Clements not only had regained his
ground, but had entered Colesberg, for which French had so long
manoeuvred in vain. The incident illustrates happily the far-reaching
effect of a great movement in mass, wisely conceived, ably directed,
and secretly executed.
CHAPTER V {p.177}
THE NATAL CAMPAIGN FROM THE INVESTMENT OF LADYSMITH THROUGH THE BATTLE
OF COLENSO
The severing of communications, by rail and telegraph, between
Ladysmith and the outer world, was the first step in a preliminary
process of attack and of defence; after which only the opponents
settled down to the relatively permanent conditions that constitute
the monotonous endurance of a siege. The British, prior to accepting
the investment, struck out right and left from day to day, by
skirmishing and reconnoitring parties; the Boers on the 9th of
November delivered an assault described as determined in character,
which will be more particularly mentioned later, but concerning which
details are singularly meagre. This no doubt is owing, partly, to the
habitual reticence of the Boers concerning {p.178} their reverses,
and partly to the isolation of the British garrison and correspondents
until a time when nearer and more exciting events engrossed the
columns of the press, crowding out this affair, already bec
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