"

The report of the Commander-in-Chief, dealing almost exclusively with
the course of events as they happened, does not particularly describe
the remaining features of the field. These must be supplied from other
sources. Above--west of--Fort Wylie, on the north side, the hills
recede somewhat from the river and rise to one of the crests mentioned
by Buller, known as Grobler's Kloof. This also was heavily fortified,
commanding, it is said, Fort Wylie and the neighbouring hills. If this
be so, success at the latter, had it been achieved, would quickly have
elicited proof of the fact. Under Grobler's Kloof, some two or three
miles up the river, was a drift {p.222} or ford, over which the plan
of attack proposed to pass the 5th or Irish Brigade, commanded by
Major-General Hart, forming the left flank of the British line. This
done, the brigade would move down stream to reinforce the main attack
on the Fort Wylie kopjes.

Below Fort Wylie the river continued south-easterly for something less
than a mile. Then with a bold sweep it curves north, and round west,
to a point half a mile north-east of the fort, when it again flows due
north for a couple of miles. From this formation results a tongue of
land, embraced in the curve, projecting to the south-east, and much
resembling a bastion, to which the subsequent northern stretch serves
as a curtain. In general effect, however, the river may be broadly
said to make below Wylie a sharp turn to the north, running that way
for two or three miles, after which it resumes its general easterly
course towards the sea. The point where it thus resumes its direction
is well to the north--rear--of the line of Boer entrenchments, between
Grobler's and Wylie, so that, if their positions were prolonged on
that {p.223} same line, they would be separated by the river. If, on
the other hand, instead of so continuing, the entrenched works were
made to follow the river course north, keeping always on the same side
of the Tugela, the main Boer positions, confronting the bridge, would
be open to enfilading fire from the eastern hills on the opposite side
below the bend.

Such conditions would seem to make this eastern part of the Boers'
position--their left flank--the weakest. The outcome of the campaign
tends to confirm this conclusion, which the author has been interested
to find also in a letter, not only composed, but published, before the
abortive attempt to turn the west flank at Spion Kop.