the Modder.

The gathering of Methuen's division had not been unwatched by the
Boers, and their forces, which, in two principal bodies of about 3,000
each, had been besieging Mafeking and Kimberley, and in other smaller
detachments were scattered along the railroad between the two places,
began to concentrate. On the 16th of October, 2,000 had occupied the
Modder River Station. On the 10th of November a reconnaissance from
Orange {p.147} River had found them occupying the ridges about
Belmont, in numbers estimated at 700. At about the same time Kimberley
noticed that the besiegers were increasing in numbers, while at
Mafeking they were observed to be decreasing. On the 20th it was known
that Cronje, whose reputation as a leader stood high, had been
detached with his commando from before Mafeking, leaving it to the
care of the local Boer troops, and going south. To these and other
unrecorded movements of the same kind, all entirely correct in
principle, are to be attributed the increasing numbers which Methuen
encountered in his successive actions. It is to be remarked here that
the Boers knew that inadequate transport material tied the British
general to the railroad; and it was the continuance of this belief,
when the difficulty had been obviated, that betrayed Cronje to his
ruin at a later date.

Leaving Orange River on the early morning of Tuesday, November 21, the
army, having rested during the extreme heat of the noons, camped on
the evening of the 22nd within five miles of the enemy's position.
This {p.148} was west of Belmont Station, and is described as a line
of kopjes extending east and west, and about two hundred feet high.
Lord Methuen's purpose in this and other actions was to cross the more
dangerous open ground of the approach by dark, arriving at the foot of
the kopjes before daylight. His line of advance being, in a general
sense, parallel to the hostile front, it had been his intention that
the left wing, after securing an eminence called Table Mountain on the
enemy's right, should swing its own left around, performing a
flanking, or else a general turning movement, pivoting upon the right
wing. In the obscurity, however, the latter lost direction and the
general found himself in consequence committed to a frontal attack.
Orders were therefore sent to the left wing, which had not lost its
direction, to conform its movements to those of the right, and the
attack was delivered in front. The Boers are e