not
only to increase greatly his task in front, but also to threaten his
rear. "The longer I remained inactive," said he, in his report, "the
stronger would the enemy become. Therefore, on the day my last
reinforcement arrived, I decided to continue my advance. It was out of
the question to follow the railway, owing to the large kopjes on
either side, which had been strongly entrenched. Besides, by that
route there was not sufficient water."

The railroad, after crossing the Modder, runs on the west side of the
river nearly due north for two miles, and then turns north-west for
two more, when it passes between two kopjes, both fortified. The
right-hand one of these, the Magersfontein, extends to the south-east
for three miles, rising there to an abrupt peak about 150 feet high,
which is the key of the situation. In the prolongation of this range a
low ridge covered with brush extends eastward to the Modder, the bed
of which thereabout follows for some distance {p.163} a north-east
and south-west line. At the foot of the peak, but some little distance
in advance, the Boers had dug a line of trenches, which not only
covered the immediate front, but at the eastern end of Magersfontein
sweep round the curve of the hill to the north for some hundred yards,
and then turned east again, following the bushy ridge to the river.
These dispositions facilitated the passage of troops from one flank to
the other under cover, and preserved control of a ford over the Modder
behind the line. The trenches, especially before the peak, were filled
with riflemen. The kopje itself was also manned, but it is allowable
to believe that the experience of the war, already illustrated by many
encounters, must have persuaded so shrewd a fighter as Cronje of the
superior advantage of the trench system. Before the trenches ran a
continuous line of barbed-wire fence. A probable estimate of the
opposing forces places the Boers at 15,000, the British at 11,000. No
certainty can as yet be predicated for the Boer numbers, which depend
upon the enemy's calculations, but that they were decisively superior
is scarcely doubtful.

After {p.164} considering the problem before him, Methuen concluded
that a turning movement was inexpedient. He could not, on the left,
follow the railroad, for that was commanded on both sides. He could
not, on the right, pass between Magersfontein and the Modder, for the
bushy ground would prevent his artillery from helping him to