chet to the rear. This is dangerous; because a
crotchet stuck on a line hinders its movements, and the enemy may
cause great loss of life by placing his artillery in the angle of
the two lines prolonged. A strong reserve in close column behind
the wing to be guarded from assault seems better to fulfill the
required condition than the crotchet; but the nature of the ground
must always decide in the choice between the two methods. Full
details on this point are given in the description of the battle of
Prague, (Chapter II. of the Seven Years' War.)

8. We must endeavor in a defensive position not only to cover the
flanks, but it often happens that there are obstacles on other
points of the front, of such a character as to compel an attack
upon the center. Such a position will always be one of the most
advantageous for defense,--as was shown at Malplaquet and Waterloo.
Great obstacles are not essential for this purpose, as the smallest
accident of the ground is sometimes sufficient: thus, the
insignificant rivulet of Papelotte forced Ney to attack
Wellington's center, instead of the left as he had been ordered.

When a defense is made of such a position, care must be taken to
hold ready for movement portions of the wings thus covered, in
order that they may take part in the action instead of remaining
idle spectators of it.

The fact cannot be concealed, however, that all these means are but
palliatives; and the best thing for an army standing on the defensive is
to _know_ how to take the offensive at a proper time, and _to take it_.
Among the conditions to be satisfied by a defensive position has been
mentioned that of enabling an easy and safe retreat; and this brings us
to an examination of a question presented by the battle of Waterloo.
Would an army with its rear resting upon a forest, and with a good road
behind the center and each wing, have its retreat compromised, as
Napoleon imagined, if it should lose the battle? My own opinion is that
such a position would be more favorable for a retreat than an entirely
open field; for a beaten army could not cross a plain without exposure
to very great danger. Undoubtedly, if the retreat becomes a rout, a
portion of the artillery left in battery in front of the forest would,
in all probability, be lost; but the infantry and cavalry and a great
part of the artillery cou