oeil_. With the Duke of
York or Moore for an antagonist, Marmont would probably have been
successful.

Among the turning maneuvers which have succeeded in our day, Waterloo
and Hohenlinden had the most brilliant results. Of these the first was
almost altogether a strategic operation, and was attended with a rare
concurrence of fortunate circumstances. As to Hohenlinden, we will
search in vain in military history for another example of a single
brigade venturing into a forest in the midst of fifty thousand enemies,
and there performing such astonishing feats as Richepanse effected in
the defile of Matenpoet, where he might have expected, in all
probability, to lay down his arms.

At Wagram the turning wing under Davoust contributed greatly to the
successful issue of the day; but, if the vigorous attack upon the center
under Macdonald, Oudinot, and Bernadotte had not rendered opportune
assistance, it is by no means certain that a like success would have
been the result.

So many examples of conflicting results might induce the conclusion that
no rule on this subject can be given; but this would be erroneous; for
it seems, on the contrary, quite evident that, by adopting as a rule an
order of battle well closed and well connected, a general will find
himself prepared for any emergency, and little will be left to chance;
but it is specially important for him to have a correct estimate of his
enemy's character and his usual style of warfare, to enable him to
regulate his own actions accordingly. In case of superiority in numbers
or discipline, maneuvers may be attempted which would be imprudent were
the forces equal or the commanders of the same capacity. A maneuver to
outflank and turn a wing should be connected with other attacks, and
opportunely supported by an attempt of the remainder of the army on the
enemy's front, either against the wing turned or against the center.
Finally, strategic operations to cut an enemy's line of communications
before giving battle, and attack him in rear, the assailing army
preserving its own line of retreat, are much more likely to be
successful and effectual, and, moreover, they require no disconnected
maneuver during the battle.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 28: For an account of these two battles, see Chapters II. and
XXV. of the Treatise on Grand Military Operations.]

ARTICLE XXXIII.

Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the March.

The accidental and unexpected meeting of