e army,
with the intention of effecting large detours around an enemy's flank,
it may be stated that their result is always doubtful, since it depends
upon such an accurate execution of carefully-arranged plans as is rarely
seen. This subject will be considered in Art. XXXII.

Besides the difficulty of depending upon the exact application of an
order of battle arranged in advance, it often happens that battles begin
without even the assailant having a well-defined object, although the
collision may have been expected. This uncertainty results either from
circumstances prior to the battle, from ignorance of the enemy's
position and plans, or from the fact that a portion of the army may be
still expected to arrive on the field.

From these things many people have concluded that it is impossible to
reduce to different systems the formations of orders of battle, or that
the adoption of either of them can at all influence the result of an
engagement,--an erroneous conclusion, in my opinion, even in the cases
cited above. Indeed, in battles begun without any predetermined plan it
is probable that at the opening of the engagement the armies will occupy
lines nearly parallel and more or less strengthened upon some point; the
party acting upon the defensive, not knowing in what quarter the storm
will burst upon him, will hold a large part of his forces in reserve, to
be used as occasion may require; the assailant must make similar efforts
to have his forces well in hand; but as soon as the point of attack
shall have been determined, the mass of his troops will be directed
against the center or upon one wing of the enemy, or upon both at once.
Whatever may be the resulting formation, it will always bear a
resemblance to one of the figures previously exhibited. Even in
unexpected engagements the same thing would happen,--which will, it is
hoped, be a sufficient proof of the fact that this classification of the
different systems or orders of battle is neither fanciful nor useless.

There is nothing even in Napoleon's battles which disproves my
assertion, although they are less susceptible than any others of being
represented by lines accurately laid down. We see him, however, at
Rivoli, at Austerlitz, and at Ratisbon, concentrating his forces toward
the center to be ready at the favorable moment to fall upon the enemy.
At the Pyramids he formed an oblique line of squares in echelon. At
Leipsic, Essling, and Brienne he used a kind