l who are familiar
with that battle know that Alvinzi and his chief of staff Weyrother
wished to surround Napoleon's little army, which was concentrated on the
plateau of Rivoli. Their center was beaten,--while their left was piled
up in the ravine of the Adige, and Lusignan with their right was making
a wide _detour_ to get upon the rear of the French army, where he was
speedily surrounded and captured.

No one can forget the day of Stockach, where Jourdan conceived the
unfortunate idea of causing an attack to be made upon a united army of
sixty thousand men by three small divisions of seven thousand or eight
thousand men, separated by distances of several leagues, whilst
Saint-Cyr, with the third of the army, (thirteen thousand men,) was to
pass twelve miles beyond the right flank and get in rear of this army of
sixty thousand men, which could not help being victorious over these
divided fractions, and should certainly have captured the part in their
rear. Saint-Cyr's escape was indeed little less than a miracle.

We may call to mind how this same General Weyrother, who had desired to
surround Napoleon at Rivoli, attempted the same maneuver at Austerlitz,
in spite of the severe lesson he had formerly received. The left wing of
the allied army, wishing to outflank Napoleon's right, to cut him off
from Vienna, (where he did not desire to return,) by a circular movement
of nearly six miles, opened an interval of a mile and a half in their
line. Napoleon took advantage of this mistake, fell upon the center, and
surrounded their left, which was completely shut up between Lakes
Tellnitz and Melnitz.

Wellington gained the battle of Salamanca by a maneuver very similar to
Napoleon's, because Marmont, who wished to cut off his retreat to
Portugal, left an opening of a mile and a half in his line,--seeing
which, the English general entirely defeated his left wing, that had no
support.

If Weyrother had been opposed to Jourdan at Rivoli or at Austerlitz, he
might have destroyed the French army, instead of suffering in each case
a total defeat; for the general who at Stockach attacked a mass of sixty
thousand men with four small bodies of troops so much separated as to be
unable to give mutual aid would not have known how to take proper
advantage of a wide detour effected in his presence. In the same way,
Marmont was unfortunate in having at Salamanca an adversary whose chief
merit was a rapid and practiced tactical _coup-d'