ing up. Villars entirely defeated at Denain
the large detachment Prince Eugene sent out in 1709 under D'Albermale.

The destruction of the great convoy Laudon took from Frederick during
the siege of Olmutz compelled the king to evacuate Moravia. The fate of
the two detachments of Fouquet at Landshut in 1760, and of Fink at Maxen
in 1759, demonstrates how difficult it is at times to avoid making
detachments, and how dangerous they may be. To come nearer our own
times, the disaster of Vandamme at Culm was a bloody lesson, teaching
that a corps must not be thrust forward too boldly: however, we must
admit that in this case the operation was well planned, and the fault
was not so much in sending out the detachment as in not supporting it
properly, as might easily have been done. That of Fink was destroyed at
Maxen nearly on the same spot and for the same reason.

Diversions or demonstrations in the zone of operations of the army are
decidedly advantageous when arranged for the purpose of engaging the
enemy's attention in one direction, while the mass of the forces is
collected upon another point where the important blow is to be struck.
In such a case, care must be taken not only to avoid engaging the corps
making the demonstration, but to recall it promptly toward the main
body. We will mention two examples as illustrations of these facts.

In 1800, Moreau, wishing to deceive Kray as to the true direction of his
march, carried his left wing toward Rastadt from Kehl, whilst he was
really filing off his army toward Stockach; his left, having simply
shown itself, returned toward the center by Fribourg in Brisgau.

In 1805, Napoleon, while master of Vienna, detached the corps of
Bernadotte to Iglau to overawe Bohemia and paralyze the Archduke
Ferdinand, who was assembling an army in that territory; in another
direction he sent Davoust to Presburg to show himself in Hungary; but he
withdrew them to Brunn, to take part in the event which was to decide
the issue of the campaign, and a great and decisive victory was the
result of his wise maneuvers. Operations of this kind, so far from being
in opposition to the principles of the art of war, are necessary to
facilitate their application.

It readily appears from what goes before that precise rules cannot be
laid down for these operations, so varied in character, the success of
which depends on so many minute details. Generals should run the risk of
making detachments only afte